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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
EXPORT CONTROL DETERMINATIONS
Dean A. Pinkert
Thomas D. Blanford*
I.

INTRODUCTION

This commentary includes: (1) a summary of the export
control laws and regulations administered by the Bureau of
Export Administration' and the U.S. Department of Commerce; (2) an outline of the review procedures available at the
agency level; (3) a discussion of the principles that govern
judicial review pursuant to the Export Administration Act
("EAA") 2 of civil enforcement and administrative export control
determinations; and (4) an analysis of reform proposals. Because reauthorization and reform of the EAA are perennial
subjects of activity on Capitol Hill, it is timely to consider
whether the scheme of judicial review might be altered to better complement review procedures available at the agency
level.
II. AN OvERviEw OF THE REGULATORY SCHEME
The Export Administration Regulations, promulgated
under the authority of the EAA, generally are focused on the
control of exports of "dual-use" commodities (commodities that
have military and commercial applications).3 The Bureau of
Export Administration is charged with administering these
regulations.4
* Dean A. Pinkert & Thomas D. Blanford of the law firm of King &
Spalding, Washington, D.C. office. The authors would like to thank Ying Z. White,
formerly of King & Spalding, Washington, D.C. office (currently on the staff of the
World Bank) for her assistance. The views and opinions expressed herein are solely those of the authors and do not represent those of King & Spalding or its clients.
1. See The Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended, 50 U.S.C. app.
§§ 2401-2420 (1988). The EAA expired in 1994. On November 13, 2000, however,
the President signed into law H.R. 5239, extending the EAA from August 20, 1994
to August 20, 2001.
2. Export Administration Act, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420 (1988).
3. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF EXPORT ADMINISTRATION,

EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS §§ 730.1-730.3, 730.6 (2000).
4. See Export Administration Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2403.
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The precursor to the EAA was the 1949 Export Control
Act.5 That statute was as much focused on economic security
as national security. Nevertheless, soon after the passage of
this legislation, the NATO allies established the Coordinating
Committee ("CoCom"). 6 CoCom was designed to prevent resources intended for the reconstruction of Europe from being
diverted to the Soviet Bloc.7 In 1994, as a result of the successful conclusion of the Cold War, CoCom was ended. A greatly relaxed post-Cold War international export control regime,
the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, came into
existence in 1996.8
The basic structure of the Export Administration Regulations was established under CoCom. Activities subject to the
regulations include: (1) exports; (2) re-exports to third countries; (3) the involvement of U.S. persons in supplying foreign origin items or in otherwise supporting a transaction with
knowledge of a proliferation link; and (4) release of technology
or software to a foreign national The regulations do not cover
exports under the exclusive jurisdiction of another federal
agency or exports of "publicly available" software and technolo0
gy.'
Unless a specific license exception applies, a company
desiring to engage in an activity subject to the regulations
involving a controlled commodity-or otherwise requiring a
license-must file a license application with the Bureau of Export Administration." Such applications are reviewed by, at a
minimum, the Departments of Commerce, State, Defense, and
Energy, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. 2
The Commerce Department also has the option of asking other
agencies to review specific license applications. Similarly, the
Defense Department can refer license requests to the National

5. See Cecil Hunt, Department of Commerce Export Controls, in COPING WITH
U.S. EXPORT CONTROLs 37, 43-46 (Evan R. Berlack & Cecil Hunt eds., Practicing
Law Institute 1998).
6. See id. at 43.
7. See id. at 43-44.
8. See Export Administration Regulations § 743 (2000).
9. See id. § 730.5.
10. Id. § 730.8.
11. See id. § 736.
12. See id. § 750.3.
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Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, or others in
the intelligence community. 3
The regulations also discuss two ways in which companies
may obtain export control information from the Bureau of
Export Administration. One way is by submitting a "classification request."'4 On the basis of data submitted regarding the
item to be classified, the Bureau of Export Administration will
advise the exporter (1) whether the item is on the control list,
and, if so, (2) the appropriate Export Control Classification
Number. 5 Companies also may request an "advisory opinion"
based on information about the item to be exported, the proposed destination, and the proposed end-use and end-user."
The Bureau of Export Administration will respond with nonbinding advice on whether a license is required and, if so,
whether it is likely to be granted.
Violations of the Export Administration Regulations are
subject to severe criminal and civil sanctions. On the civil side,
Bureau of Export Administration counsel may file chdrges with
an administrative law judge (ALJ)seeking civil fines or administrative sanctions.'7 Administrative sanctions include "denial
orders." 8 These orders bar exports by the sanctioned person-and related parties-as well as the supply to such persons
of items that have been exported from the United States.
III. AGENCY LEVEL REVIEW OF CiviL ENFORCEMENT UNDER
THE EAA
The exporter is entitled to notice of the charges against
him and an opportunity to be heard by the ALJ.The AU must
then determine whether the evidence supports the charges.
The AL's determination is reviewable in the first instance by
the Under Secretary of Commerce for Export Administration. 9 The scope of the Under Secretary's review of ALJ de-

13. See Export Controls: Issues Related to Commercial Communications Satellites: Testimony Before the United States Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence,
105th Cong. 3 (1998) (statement of Katherine V. Schinasi, Associate Director, United States General Accounting Office).
14. 15 C.F.R. § 748.3(b) (2000).
15. See id.
16. Id. § 748.3(c).
17. See Export Administration Regulations § 764 (2000).
18. Id.
19. See 15 C.F.R. § 766.22 (2000).
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terminations has been clarified by two decisions of the D.C.
Circuit.
Iran Air v. Kugelman ° provides an overview of the agency-level review mechanisms available to parties charged with
civil violations.2 ' In 1990, the Bureau of Export Administration sought to impose civil penalties on Iran Air for unauthorized re-exportation to Iran of certain dual-use products. Iran
Air requested a hearing before an ALJ pursuant to § 2412(c)(1)
of the EAA" After receiving evidence and argument from the
parties to the dispute, the ALJ ruled that the EAA authorizes
sanctions only for knowing violations of the Export Administration Regulations.' As the U.S. Government had not proven
that Iran Air had knowledge of its alleged civil offenses, the
ALJ dismissed the charges. The Under Secretary reversed the
ALJ on this point, finding that knowledge is not a required
element of a civil enforcement action, and remanded for appropriate reconsideration. 4 On remand, the ALJ refused to follow the agency's reading of the law and dismissed the charges
again. The Under Secretary vacated the AUJ's second decision
and remanded for redetermination.' The ALJ issued a third
order rejecting the agency's construction of the statute.26 The
Under Secretary once again vacated the ALJ's decision and
issued a final order imposing penalties and suspending Iran
Air's export privileges.
Iran Air appealed the decision to the D.C. Circuit, arguing
that the Under Secretary acted beyond her authority by overturning the determination of the ALJ.28 The D.C. Circuit upheld the Under Secretary's authority to overturn an AUJ's
determination on a matter of law, finding this authority to be
necessary to facilitate the implementation of uniform agency
policies with respect to the EAA. The court further found "permissible" the Under Secretary's view that knowledge is not a

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

996 F.2d 1253 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
See id. at 1255.
Export Adminstration Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2412(c)(1) (1988).
See Iran Air, 996 F.2d at 1255.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1257.
See id.
See id. at 1256.
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required element of proof in a civil violation case under the
EAA. 9
The court distinguished Iran Air from an earlier landmark
determination that limited the prerogatives of the Under Secretary."0 In Dart v. United States," the Court held: (1) sections 13(a) and 13(c) of the EAA do not provide an exemption
from judicial review for decisions of the Under Secretary that
fail to "affirm, modify, or vacate" determinations of the ALJ;
and (2) the Under Secretary is required to defer to certain
determinations of the AU.' Iran Air made it clear that such
deference is required only with respect to the ALU's factual
determinations.
IV. JUDIcAL REVIEW OF BUREAU OF EXPORT ADMINISTRATION
DETERMINATIONS
The general rule under the EAA is that Department of
Commerce export control determinations are not subject to
judicial review.3 3 The following matters, however, represent
exceptions to the general rule:
1. the34imposition of civil penalties and denial of export privileges;
2. collection of civil penalties;"5 and
3. suits by parties to compel the Department of Commerce to
act on a license application. 6
Cases in the first category are heard in the Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit. EAA § 2412(c)(1), however, provides that
the review is limited to the determinations necessary to establish liability.37 Cases in the second and third categories are
heard, in the first instance, in federal district court.

29. Iran Air, 996 F.2d at 1256.
30. See id. at 1253.
31. 848 F.2d 217, 231 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
32. Id. at 231.
33. See Export Administration Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2401 (1988).
34. Id. § 2412(c)(3), (d)(3).
35. Id. § 2410(f).
36. Id. § 2409(j)(2). Prior to filing suit to compel the Department of Commerce
to act on a license application, parties must first petition the Secretary of Commerce.
37. Id. § 2412(c)(1).
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The Moller-Butcher case illustrates the interplay between
limitations on judicial review of civil enforcement determinations and the distinct roles of the AUJ and the Under Secretary
under the EAA. In 1984, Moller-Butcher and a company he
controlled were charged with multiple violations of the EAA."8
In 1986, the ALJ imposed sanctions, denying Moller-Butcher
export privileges for twenty years.39 The Secretary of Commerce affirmed the ALJ's decision. 41 In 1990, Moller-Butcher
filed a motion with the ALJ seeking to reduce the sanctions.
The ALJ granted Moller-Butcher's motion. The Under Secretary issued an order denying the motion for modification, finding that the ALJ's determination merely was advisory.4 '
Moller-Butcher appealed the Under Secretary's order to the
42
D.C. Circuit.
The court held that the EAA clearly limits the court's
review authority to "questions concerning the liability which
occasioned the sanction at issue, not the sanction itself."43 Because Moller-Butcher's challenge did not address liability for
the imposed sanction, the court was without jurisdiction to
review the Under Secretary's order. In addition, the court noted that it may review claims that the Under Secretary exceeded her authority in disposing of a determination by the ALJ.44
In this case, however, the Under Secretary properly "vacated"
the action of the ALJ and thus acted within the scope of her
45
authority.
One of the unusual features of the judicial review scheme
is that determinations to impose civil penalties are subject to
litigation on two tracks. First, the determination to impose a
civil penalty may be litigated up through the ALJ,the Under
Secretary, and the D.C. Court of Appeals.4 6 Second, if the penalty is imposed but not paid, the Department of Commerce

38. See Moller-Butcher v. U.S. Dep't. of Commerce, 12 F.3d 249, 252 (D.C.
Cir. 1994).
39. See id. at 250.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. Id. at 252.
44. See Moiler-Butcher, 12 F.3d at 252.
45. Id.
46. See Export Administration Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2412(c)(1), (c)(3) (1988).
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must file an action to collect the unpaid amount and must
prove its case de novo before a federal district court.
Two important categories of determinations are not subject
to judicial review under the EAA: classification decisions and
license denials. 48 In both cases, however, administrative review procedures are available to aggrieved parties. 49 These
procedures leave final decision-making authority in the hands
of the Under Secretary for Export Administration.
V. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
Proposals for reauthorization of the EAA frequently are
accompanied by proposals for reform of review procedures.
General objectives of reform include increasing agency accountability and eliminating duplicative procedures.
In 1994, the Customs and International Trade Bar Association ("CITBA") recommended that the Court of International
Trade ("CIT") be given jurisdiction in lawsuits seeking judicial
review under the EAA.5" According to CITBA, "it would be
logical to give the CIT jurisdiction in these cases because these
lawsuits challenge government actions affecting international
trade in goods."5 ' Two additional considerations support
CITBA's proposal. First, under the current scheme, only a
handful of appeals have been taken to the D.C. Circuit. Exporters might be more inclined to bring appeals to a court of specialized international trade jurisdiction. Second, the CIT has
substantial relevant experience. The CIT already considers
appeals "on the record" from international trade determinations, in particular, cases involving allegations of unfair trade
practices by foreign governments and companies.5 2 Such cases
frequently have a foreign policy aspect and require the protection of sensitive information. Moreover, the CIT reviews classification decisions of the U.S. Customs Service.

47. See id. § 2412(f).
48. See id. § 2412(e).
49. See 15 C.F.R. § 756.2 (2000).
50. See Customs and International Trade Bar Association, Recommended Expansions in the Jurisdiction of the U.S. Court of International Trade (1994) (unpublished recommendations to the U.S. Court of International Trade) (on file with
author).
51. Id. at 5.
52. Id.
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If the CITBA proposal is adopted, and more export control
cases are litigated, a concern arises about the resolution of civil
enforcement disputes in a timely manner. One way to streamline procedures would be to take away the responsibility of the
Under Secretary for Export Administration to review legal
determinations of the ALJ. Another would be to eliminate
duplicative litigation of civil penalty determinations. In fact, in
the 106th Congress, the Clinton Administration supported
legislation that would have reauthorized the EAA and reformed it along these lines.53 Under the draft legislation, enforcement proceedings under the EAA would be subject to "onetrack" judicial review under the Administrative Procedures
Act.54 In addition, review by the Under Secretary no longer
would be required. Although the exporter would maintain the
right to appeal the AI's determinations to the Under Secretary, the decision of the AIJ would become the decision of the
Commerce Department, if the exporter chooses not to appeal.
The 106th Congress did not enact any reforms of the EAA."5
Another reform proposal is for judicial review of classification determinations.5 6 The claimed benefits of the proposal
are improved accuracy and greater public confidence in these
determinations. The potential negative consequences include
delay, uncertainty, and the inability to respond flexibly to an
ever-evolving national security policy environment.
A less radical way to address concerns about classification
determinations might be to permit an ALJ to review such
determinations under an "arbitrary and capricious" standard of
review. The ALJ's decision would be final and non-appealable.
This approach would both introduce a greater degree of accountability into classification decision-making and avoid the
pitfalls of a cumbersome review process.

53. See F. Amanda DeBusk, Role of Judicial Review in Administrative Enforcement Cases, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 853 (2001).
54. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701, 706 (1994).
55. See supra note 1.
56. See Larry Christensen, Address at the Eleventh Annual Judicial Conference of the U.S. Court of International Trade (Dec. 7, 1999) (on file with author).
See also DeBusk, supra note 53.
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VI. CONCLUSION

It can be expected that Congess will continue to deliberate
over reauthorization and reform of the EAA. Any reform of
review mechanisms for classification and/or civil enforcement
determinations should balance the twin objectives of increasing
the accessibility of judicial review and ensuring that review
procedures-both administrative and judicial-do not become so
cumbersome as to impede significantly the achievement of legitimate national security and foreign policy objectives.

